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We inherited a corrupted and bad economy. It was a mafia economy rather than a market 
economy. We are trying to rebuild the new Iraq on a solid basis.[1] - Adel Abdul-Mahdi, 
Iraqi Finance Minister 
The Americans are coming to understand that they cannot change everything they want 
to change in Iraq. They need to let the Iraqi people decide the big issues.[2] - Adel Abdul-
Mahdi, Iraqi Interim Government Finance Minister 
Introduction 
Leading up to the war and especially after the swift military defeat of Saddam Hussein's regime, optimism 
was running high among many Iraqis and American planners that the country would be quickly 
transformed into a free, democratic nation with a liberalized market economy. Yet even after the June 28, 
2004, transfer of sovereignty to an interim Iraqi government, the obstacles to these goals loom larger than 
ever. The insurrection is taking a huge toll on U.S. troops, Iraqi citizens, foreign aid workers, and 
diplomats. In their desperate attempt to force the United States out of Iraq, the insurgents are resorting to 
tactics that sabotage the country's economic reconstruction. More importantly, their actions are making it 
almost impossible for responsible Iraqis to create those democratic institutions that could make the 
country a showcase for the many neighboring Arab countries currently drifting listlessly in repressive 
backwardness.[3]  
 
United States hopes to bring economic gains and democracy to the Middle East and North Africa region 
as a whole are also being reassessed in light of the insurgency and Arab criticism of the manner in which 
the Iraqi situation has been handled. The original idea of revitalizing the region arose in response to 
September 11th and the growth of Islamic extremism. At that time U.S. authorities began to realize that 
the lack of democracy and freedom, economic stagnation and widespread unemployment were driving 
many young people in the Middle East and North Africa towards extremism and terrorism. The existence 
of pro-American, yet autocratic regimes was no longer a guarantee for lasting stability. But since the time 
a first draft of the reform plan for economic and political liberalization, dubbed the Greater Middle East 
Initiative (GMEI)[4], was leaked in February 2004, Arab reaction has been less than enthusiastic.  
 
Many of the generalities found in discussions concerning the wisdom and viability of U.S. backed Middle 
East reforms are of little value in assessing the outcome of these efforts. Clearly many Middle Eastern 
countries are highly skeptical of the U.S. approach to reforms and motives for change in the region, so 
implementation is highly problematical. But even with broad acceptance throughout the region of the need 
for reforms, a number of daunting obstacles remain. The current state of affairs is best summed up by 
Anthony Cordesman:  
Broad, vacuous U.S. calls for region-wide change are the last thing needed in a climate 
of such deep regional distrust; they only aid the cause of terrorism. Washington instead 
should work steadily with its G8 partners, friendly Arab governments and local Arab 
reformers to create reform initiatives tailored to a given country's needs that inspire 
confidence that the United States wants reform for the country's sake rather than for its 
own political ends. It should also be recognized that the United States cannot succeed 
without fully funded nation-by-nation efforts tailored to the economic, social, and political 
needs of given countries.[5] 
More fundamentally, the objectives of the reforms often proposed are too vague—a market economy, 
democracy, and so on. On a technical level, some reforms are no doubt much more effective than others 
in creating a positive environment of growth and stability. Yet even in most high-level discussions of the 
U.S. initiative the likely linkages between reforms and outcomes are never made clear. In fact, this 
quantitative dimension is almost totally disregarded in the on-going debates, no doubt contributing even 
further to the widespread ambivalence, suspicion, and skepticism concerning reforms that is pervasive 
throughout the region. 
 
The sections below attempt to address the quantitative dimension of reforms through developing a 
framework for identifying country needs and sequencing strategies. Which countries are in the greatest 
need of reforms? Which reform mix appears most effective given the existing state of affairs in each 
country? How can reforms be efficiently sequenced to fit into a long-term strategy of increased stability 
and prosperity?  
Areas of Reform  
The reforms often suggested for the Middle East by U.S. officials fall into two broad categories: (a) those 
intended to develop efficient market-based economies, with increased economic freedom, and (b) those 
related to democracy and improved governance.  
Economic Freedom 
Both the Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal's Index of Economic Freedom[7] and the Fraser 
Institute's Economic Freedom of the World[8] provide good measures of the relative progress made by 
countries in moving to a deregulated, limited government, free-market environment. Because the Heritage 
Foundation data set included more of the Middle Eastern countries it was used for the analysis that 
follows. The Heritage Index reflects the absence of government constraint or coercion on the production, 
distribution, or consumption of goods and services. Stripped to its essentials, economic freedom is 
concerned with property rights and choice. To measure economic freedom the Heritage Foundation/Wall 
Street Journal Index takes ten different factors into account:  
1. Trade policy; 
2. Fiscal burden of government; 
3. Government intervention in the economy; 
4. Monetary policy; 
5. Banking and finance; 
6. Capital flows and foreign investment; 
7. Wages and prices; 
8. Property rights; 
9. Regulation, and 
10. Informal market. 
Implied in these measures is the notion that economic freedom also requires governments to refrain from 
many activities. They must refrain from actions that interfere with personal choice, voluntary exchange, 
and the freedom to enter and compete in labor and product markets. Economic freedom is reduced when 
taxes, government expenditures, and regulations are substituted for personal choice, voluntary exchange 
and market coordination. Restrictions that limit entry into occupations and business activities also retard 
economic freedom. 
 
The index provides a framework for understanding most of the objectives of U.S. reform efforts in the 
region: how open countries are to competition; the degree of state intervention in the economy, whether 
through taxation, spending, or overregulation, and the strength and independence of a country's judiciary 
to enforce rules and protect private property. Some countries may have freedom in all factors; others may 
have freedom in just a few. One of the most important findings of research carried out using the index is 
that economic freedom is required in all aspects of economic life. That is countries must score well in all 
ten of the factors in order to improve their economic efficiency and consequently the living standards of 
their people.[8] 
Governance 
The other main area of U.S. reform efforts, democracy and governance, are increasingly seen as 
essential for long run economic growth and prosperity. In fact some dimensions of governance now sit at 
the center of academic and policy discussions of economic development.[9]  
 
While the ranking of countries on the basis of their relative progress in attaining improved governance is 
inherently subjective, a recent World Bank study provides a set of rankings incorporating the full extent of 
our knowledge about this phenomenon. More precisely, the World Bank data set presents a set of 
estimates of six dimensions of governance covering 199 countries and territories for 1996, 1998, 2000, 
and 2002.  
Voice and Accountability 
This variable measures various aspects of the political process, civil liberties, and political rights. These 
indicators measure the extent to which the citizens of a country are able to participate in the selection of 
governments. Also included in this variable are indicators measuring the independence of the media.  
 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence 
 
This governance cluster combines several indicators that measure perceptions of the likelihood that the 




This variable combines aspects of the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, 
the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the 




This aspect of governance is more focused on the policies themselves. It includes measures of the 
incidence of market-unfriendly policies such as price controls or inadequate bank supervision as well as 
perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive regulation in areas such as foreign trade and business 
development. 
 
Rule of Law 
 
Included in this dimension of governance are several indicators that measure the extent to which the 
citizens of a country have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. These include perceptions of 
the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of 
contracts.  
 
Control of Corruption 
 
This dimension of governance measures perceptions of corruption. By this measure corruption is defined 
as the exercise of public power for private gain. It is often a manifestation of a lack of respect of both the 
corrupter and the corrupted for the rules that govern their interactions, and hence represents a failure of 
governance. 
 
As a whole, the Greater Middle East Initiative countries have lagged considerably behind other major 
groupings of countries (Table 1). The high growth (so-called "catching-up") developing countries[11]—
Malaysia, Thailand, Mexico, etc., have made considerably more progress in nearly all of the major areas 
of reform. In turn there is a comparable but generally smaller gap between the various reform measures 
of the catching-up and advanced countries.  
 
The reform gap between the Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI) countries and those catching up to the 
advanced economies is particularly evident in the main dimensions of governance (lower values in Table 
1 represent a worsening of governance). While the gaps between the GMEI countries and the catching up 
countries are not as great in the economic freedom area, they are still fairly consistent (higher values in 
Table 1 for these variables signifies a worsening of economic freedom) across all ten dimensions with the 
exception of monetary policy.  
 
Finally, the standard deviations of nearly all reform dimensions are relatively high across the board for the 
Greater Middle East Initiative countries. This suggests considerably more diversity of reform experiences 
within this group of countries relative to those found in the catching up and advanced economies.  
A Conceptual Framework 
The various dimensions of economic freedom and governance provide a good gauge of the progress 
made by the GMEI countries in reforming their economies and political systems. However, to fully 
appreciate the contribution made by these reforms, one needs to see them in a broader context. Which 
combinations and levels of reforms appear to be associated with higher levels of development and 
modernization? Which reform strategies appear most efficient in placing a country on the path to 
sustainable levels of prosperity? What is a reasonable period of time to assess a country's progress in 
creating an environment capable of supporting a process of on-going growth and development?  
 
Since both the catching up and advanced economy groupings are defined largely on their member 
country's over-all economic performance, sub-groupings of the GMEI countries also based on an 
economic performance/modernization criteria should provide a more insightful framework for assessing 
each country's reform progress to date as well as the tasks that lie ahead.  
 
As with the catching-up and advanced groups of countries, one approach is to examine sub-groups of 
GMEI countries based on their relative development or stage of economic progress. A stage approach is 
hardly new. For several centuries historians and philosophers have been attracted by the possibility of 
expressing the historical process as a sequence of stages instead of a simple chronological succession. 
Examples of such attempts include Marx's well-known pattern by which feudalism gave way to bourgeois 
capitalism followed by socialism and then communism. This stage approach was especially influential in 
German historiography. Karl Bucher discussed the evolution of the "household economy" of antiquity into 
the "town economy" of the late Middle Ages, and thereafter into the "national economy" of modern times.  
 
The common aim of stage theories is to design a model of the historical process by specifying and 
isolating a limited number of factors that characterize and identify the different stages. Such models are 
illuminating and justifiable if they identify genuine key variables and reveal otherwise unexpected 
relationships. Their suitability for prediction is especially significant. Most models implicitly or explicitly 
claim to explain or predict through postulated changes in the key variables. These changes are in turn 
derived either from a priori reasoning, or on the basis of empirical data. Without the specified changes, 
development from one stage to another will not occur, or will occur only exceptionally. If a model can 
successfully identify the key variables and significant changes in them propelling a country to a higher 
level of development and modernization, then a power tool of explanation and prediction will have been 
created. In this regard, several modern stage theories hold out the potential for providing a useful 
framework for assessing the role of reforms in advancing the GMEI countries.  
The Rostow Framework 
Of the modern stage theories, that developed by W.W. Rostow[12] is by far the most widely discussed. 
Rostow, an economic historian, was interested in explaining why some countries became advanced 
developed economies, while others remained mired in poverty. His framework draws on observations 
taken from the histories of developed countries, which he contended to reveal a considerable degree of 
uniformity with regard to patterns and processes of development.  
 
Based on these observations he divided the modernization process into five stages: (1) the traditional 
society, (2) the preconditions for take-off, (3) the take-off stage, (4) the drive to maturity and (5) the age of 
high mass consumption. His basic argument was that (1) all societies sooner or later, will pass through 
the same sequence of five economic stages, (2) the world's poor societies and simply those that have not 
passed beyond the first two states, and (3) development is a process whereby traditional values are 
replaced by a spirit of individualism and a scientific attitude that encourages economic growth and 
technological progress.  
 
For each stage, Rostow specified a number of distinguishing characteristics. The preconditions stage was 
characterized by his as a period of dramatic increases in agricultural productivity, political stability, heavy 
migration to the cities, substantial development of transportation and other forms of social overhead 
capital, and increasing capital goods imports financed by capital inflows and well as by raw material 
exports.  
 
The takeoff state is characterized by a jump in the rate of productive investment from 5 percent or less to 
10 percent or more of national income, the development of one or more substantial manufacturing sector 
with a high growth rates, and the existence or quick emergence of a political, social, and institutional 
framework "which exploits the impulses to expansion in the modern sector and the potential external 
economy effects of the take-off and gives to growth an on-going character."[13] Furthermore, the time 
required for the takeoff period should be relatively short, no longer than twenty to thirty years. Finally the 
post-takeoff stage is characterized by a shift of leading sectors, an eventual smoothing out of the growth 
rates, and less and less structural change. 
 
While appearing straightforward, Rostow's approach to modernization/development has come under 
relentless attack.[14] Academic careers have been made by simply finding holes and inconsistencies in 
his approach. One line of criticism contends that Rostow's theory failed to recognize that developing 
countries are surrounded by a quite different international economic system than the system that 
surrounded the advanced countries at the time when they began to develop. As proponents of 
dependency theory indicated, the economic positions of the developed and underdeveloped countries of 
the world are linked historically and cannot be understood in isolation from one another. 
 
Other valid criticisms surround Rostow's use of stages. A closer look at his framework suggests that 
many of the stages are not defined by a set of unique variables—high rates of savings and investment 
were probably necessary to complete the pre-conditions stage, especially where extensive infrastructure 
was required.  
 
On a more fundamental level, it is clear that the building of a classificatory system does not, by itself, 
constitute a stage theory. As noted above, the theory must also explain how and why any particular 
country moves from one stage to another. In that respect, Rostow's efforts appear incomplete and 
unsuccessful. For example, in explaining the transition to takeoff, Rostow suggests that industrialization 
and takeoff may be induced by a favorable shift in the terms of trade resulting from the rise in agricultural 
productivity in the preconditions stage. However, capital imports, urbanization, education, 
entrepreneurship, the opening up of foreign markets, and numerous other factors provide alternative 
explanations. 
 
Finally, implicit in the Rostow model is the notion that countries advance from one stage to another, yet 
there are numerous examples noted below of countries that appeared to take off, but later fell back rather 
than advancing to the drive-to-maturity stage. In retrospect, Rostow greatly underestimated the force of 
negative factors created during the growth process—factors that often became strong enough to retard or 
even stop the growth/modernization process.  
 
In sum, when using Rostow's approach one has great difficulty formulating a demarcation rule for 
deciding whether at a finite point in time a specific country can be classified in one stage or another. Nor 
is it clear the precise manner in which a country advances to the next stage. Because the mechanisms of 
stage placement and advancement are vague in Rostow, the model has proved to be of very limited value 
in policy discussions. In effect, it is a tautology—countries take-off when they satisfy the conditions for 
take-off.  
The New Second World Framework 
No doubt benefiting from the insights provided by Rostow's critics, Jennifer Bremer and John D. Kasarda 
have recently constructed[15] a stage theory taking into account many of the growth depressing elements 
Rostow overlooked forty years earlier. They term their main conceptual construct "The New Second 
World". This is a group of countries that have reached middle-income status over the past two decades 
and that are now in the midst of the critical economic and political transitions from Third World to the First. 
 
The New Second World transition has three phases. The first, or early phase, typically begins when a 
low-income country starts to industrialize rapidly, launching an agrarian-industrial transition and the 
complex transformations—urbanization, income growth, economic diversification—that accompany it. A 
process similar, but not identical to Rostow's take-off, occurs if growth continues for a decade or more. In 
that case the country reaches the middle New Second World phase.  
 
In the second phase, industrial production per capita may now be around three times what it was when 
the transition started, and growth in low-value-added manufacturing is rapid and sustained. Incomes rise 
and a middle class begins to emerge. Bremer and Kasarda note that if this middle phase continues for ten 
to twenty years, the country would likely reach the advanced phase, often a time of recurring economic 
crisis and political turmoil. Countries currently in this advanced group include Argentina, Brazil, and 
Poland. 
 
Since many of the key Middle Eastern countries are in the first stage or "failed take-off stage"—Iran, Iraq, 
Syria, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan (included in the United States' Greater Middle East Initiative)[16], our 
attention is focused mainly on the problems encountered by that group. These countries have failed to 
move forward to the middle stage largely because of growth-limiting policies and institutional rigidities. As 
Bremer and Kasarda note: 
History suggests that failure to make steady progress through the New Second World 
transition's early phase to the middle period is extremely dangerous. If the transition stalls 
here—as it did in post-World War I Russia, and as it has now in much of the Middle 
East—failure can lead to revolution and Al Qaeda-style international violence.  
In fact, terrorism and environments that breed it are central to Bremer and Kasarda's model. Terrorism is 
one of the negative side effects neglected by Rostow and no doubt responsible for that model's poor 
predictive capabilities.  
 
The one thing that the nations stuck in the early phase have in common is slowness in adopting choice 
based systems. Bremer and Kasarda define "choice-based" systems as encompassing both market-
based economies and democratic political institutions and organizations.  
In sum, the Second World country groupings identified by Bremer and Kasarda should be able to be 
defined (profiled) largely in terms of their attainment of the various economic freedom and governance 
reforms listed above. If this is the case, their framework lends itself to the country placement in stages 
and the requirements for their succession to higher stages that alluded Rostow.  
Stages of Reform in the GMEI Countries 
Based on Bremer and Kasarda's characterization of Second World Development, a sample of countries 
were selected, with each country broadly meeting the profile of one of their unique stages. Sixteen 
countries were initially deemed first stage or failed take-off countries, six countries were placed in their 
second stages, and twenty-five were classified as stage three countries. A fourth group of countries, 
normally considered "Advanced Developed Countries," was also included in the analysis.  
 
A statistical technique, discriminant analysis[17] was then performed[18] to determine if the countries 
were "correctly" grouped. That is, is it possible for the six governance and ten economic freedom 
variables to define four sets (corresponding to the three New Second World and one advanced 
developed) of unique reform environments? If this is the case, countries possessing a particular set of 
reform attainments would be classified with a high degree of probability in one of these groups. In this 
case the discriminate procedure would generate a numerical function, indicating, for each country, the 
reforms necessary and the extent to which critical areas would have to be improved if the country were to 
advance to the next stage. 
 
The analysis found that the relative country attainment in only five reform areas (in declining order of 
importance): government effectiveness, voice, regulation, regulatory quality, informal markets, and fiscal 
burden (Table 2) were sufficient to correctly place all of the sample countries in their anticipated stages of 
development (Table 2).[19] 
 
As in any good stage theory of development there is a gradual improvement in most indices as one 
moves from lower to higher stages[20] (Table 3). This pattern is particularly evident in the governance 
area. The first stage countries score particularly low in is this general area of reform. As of 2002, the last 
date of comparable data, Iraq, Libya, Nigeria, and Tajikistan most closely fit the profile (based on the 
probability of correct placement) of first stage countries. Of course, Iraq's situation, and to a much lesser 
extent Libya's, has changed dramatically since 2002. Iraq has introduced a number of positive economic 
reforms, and has also made some beginnings in the governance area. However, as of the summer of 
2004, neither country had undertaken those major reforms in governance necessary to lay the foundation 
for movement to stage two. Also it is not clear how many of these U.S. initiated reforms will be retained by 
the Iraqi Interim Government.  
 
On the other hand, Pakistan, Armenia, Bosnia, and Albania show some of the characteristics often 
associated with the second stage group. They are currently addressing many of their governance 
deficiencies, albeit still short of the effort needed to graduate to stage two status. 
In the context of Bremer and Kasarda's theory, the first stage countries are unable to sustain their take-
offs due to diminishing returns caused by poor regulation, corruption, ineffective government, and the lack 
of democracy. The high rates of investment and industrialization noted by Rostow were not sufficient to 
overcome the barriers imposed by these institutional shortcomings.  
 
As noted, a large number of Middle Eastern countries were profiled in this group: Iran, Iraq, Libya, 
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. While improvements in the sixteen areas of reform eventually occur as 
countries move to higher stages, progress in government effectiveness and political stability appear 
particularly critical for the advancement of the first stage countries to the second stage (Table 4). Based 
on the large gap in discriminant values between the first and second groups, with the exception of 
Pakistan, most of these countries have a long way to go before reaching second stage status. A realistic 
time frame for this transition, assuming persistent efforts at reform, is at least ten years. 
 
As Bremer and Kasarda suggest, stage two is likely to be a fairly long and peaceful period of growth and 
consolidation. Egypt and Turkey are well profiled to be in this group, with India best positioned to advance 
to the next stage. To advance to the third stage however, several areas of reform appear critical (Table 
5). While significant strides have to be made in a number of reform categories, voice, regulation, and 
foreign investment are the areas in need of special attention.  
Taiwan appears to be the country currently best placed to reach advanced country status (Table 6). Of 
the sample Middle East countries, only the UAE falls in this group. A wide variety of reforms appear 
essential for advancement, including fiscal burden, informal markets, voice, monetary policy, and property 
rights.  
 
In sum, the findings presented above are quite encouraging. Usually significant progress in only several 
key reform areas at a time is necessary to produce significant results. In this regard great flexibility exists. 
In the case of movement from the first to second stage, progress is critical in government effectiveness 
and political stability. However, equal efforts are not required in both areas. Depending on internal 
political constraints some countries might want to opt for relatively more effort in the effectiveness area, 
while others might feel more comfortable in the political stability area—both strategies have the potential 
to be successful in elevating a particular country to the next stage.  
Constraints on GMEI Reforms 
While an honest effort at reform appears to pay extremely high dividends in terms of economic progress 
and stability, initiating serious action in this area in the GMEI countries will be another matter. As noted 
above, few in the Middle East appear neutral when it comes to U.S. reform initiatives. While many appear 
to feel economic and political reforms are necessary and overdue, many are highly skeptical over those 
proposed by the U.S. Those Arabs with serious doubts about the Initiative fall into three distinct 
groups[21] : 
Cautious optimists: This group sees the U.S. reform initiatives as a positive project in 
principle with the potential to help the region modernize itself politically and economically, 
but only if certain preconditions, involving acceptability of the core concepts to the 
regional actors, are met. Just as importantly, participation would be wise only under the 
understanding that each country has its own special needs and aspirations that must be 
respected. In Iraq this group is represented by many of the returning expatriates as well 
as a fairly large number of technocrats from the former regime.  
Pessimists: This view dismisses the project as unwise and undoable. A foreign made 
project designed to transform Muslim countries through foreign social engineering will 
trigger deep regional resistance. The Initiative will only create greater instability. In Iraq, 
the inability of the U.S. neoliberal economic reforms[22] to date to produce tangible 
results in the form of job creation and economic growth has resulted in large segments of 
the population subscribing to this interpretation. 
Rejectionists/Conspiracy Theorists: This group is largely comprised of Islamists who 
believe that the Initiative is simply another ploy by Western imperialists designed to 
destroy their culture and identity.  
A very casual reading of the Iraqi and regional newspapers suggests most observers fall into the second 
group. Still large segments of the populace subscribe to the third position. Significantly, however, the 
United States' two main allies in the region fall in the first group. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and 
Saudi Arabian King Fahd and Crown Prince Abdullah are on record to the effect that Arab states proceed 
on the path of development, modernization, and reform in keeping with their people's interests and 
values.  
Assessment 
The analysis above demonstrates the basic soundness of the U.S. GMEI initiative. While that initiative's 
early versions have been frustratingly vague on details, it is easy to conceive of a range of reform 
programs with strong links to improved economic performance and stability. In the last several decades, 
scores of the current stage three countries initiating similar packages of reforms have made significant 
progress in assuring their long-run prosperity. However, unless the United States finds a way to work 
within the set of parameters noted above by the cautious optimists, U.S. reform initiatives in the region 
will have little chance of living up to their potential. 
The experience to date with reforms in the GMEI region suggests several lessons the United States and 
other like-minded countries will have to absorb before significant progress at meaningful reform takes 
place in the region: 
1. Although textbook economics provides a number of guidelines for reform, the actual 
reforms should be homegrown and should take into consideration internal conditions, 
national objectives, and limitations of the individual countries.  
2. Care should be taken so that reform efforts are not undermined by poor 
macroeconomic policymaking. Governmental actions should consciously take economic 
ramifications into account. 
3. While adequate financing reforms are essential in many cases, it is more important to 
change attitudes—people need to see how they are benefiting from the reforms.  
4. In turn, the beneficiaries of reform will place pressure on the authorities for further 
reform. In this regard, the sequencing of reforms will be critical in assuring that the reform 
process will not become stalled 
5. Economic reforms will be unsuccessful in permanently improving standards of living in 
the region unless there is a fundamental change in attitudes towards markets and 
competition. 
Perhaps Henry Azzam best sums up this last point: 
Allowing markets to prevail requires having a set of cultural values that emphasize the 
virtue of competition, the ability to create and gain in a socially acceptable way, the 
legitimacy of profits and the importance of freedom of transaction. Spreading a market 
culture in the region is therefore not only an exercise in economic restructuring but also 
an acceptance of the basic values and standards that make the system work.[23]  
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights home 
page. 
To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox at the beginning of each month, 
email ccc@nps.edu with subject line "Subscribe". There is no charge, and your address will be used 
for no other purpose. 
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